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Abstract
Information flows are necessary for well-functioning financial markets. However, in 
many emerging markets, the legal and institutional preconditions for proper information 
flow are not met. How do such markets respond? We argue that they respond by 
developing innovative information transmission mechanisms. We identify one such 
mechanism associated with the evolution of equity markets in South Asia. The 
mechanism operates through a financing instrument unique to India and Pakistan, called 
badla in local parlance. We develop a signaling model in which a broker-financier signals 
his private information to investors by choosing various levels of financing to provide in 
the badla market for stocks. A fully separating equilibrium exists allowing full 
discrimination of various types of stocks. Hence, information transmission takes place 
through this channel.
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1Information Transmission in Emerging Markets: The Case of a Unique 
Financing Instrument
Ever since Akerlof (1970), it has been argued that information flows are necessary for
markets to function properly in a world of asymmetric information. If buyer and seller
have different information regarding the value of the item to be exchanged, a “lemons 
market” may arise. Unable to distinguish between high-quality and low-quality goods, 
buyers may not be willing to pay a price that elicits the supply of anything other than the 
lowest-quality items. Consequently, potential gains from trade may go unrealized. A 
large number of papers in finance have identified various information transmission 
mechanisms operating in financial markets. Ross (1977) identifies the management’s 
choice of debt level as a possible indicator of true value to outsiders. Leland and Pyle 
(1977) point out that the amount of self-financing by entrepreneurs can be a credible 
indicator of value. Bhattacharya (1979), Meyers and Majluf (1984), Vermaelen (1984), 
John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) are other examples of models in 
which managers successfully transmit their private information to outsiders through 
various mechanisms. It is clear that a properly functioning equity market requires a 
complex set of interlinked institutions, both formal and informal to strengthen 
information flow. 
In emerging markets, the question of information transmission becomes even 
more important since legal and institutional preconditions for proper information flow as 
pointed out in Black (2001) typically do not exist. Debt-signaling as in Ross (1977) 
cannot be the mechanism in many emerging markets since this framework requires 
truthful reporting of the debt level. Just as one example, weak governance allows firms in 
Pakistan to disguise equity as debt for tax advantages.1 It is common knowledge that 
weak governance in many emerging economies allows significant tax evasion to occur. 
Entrepreneurs interested in hiding their wealth from tax authorities are not likely to use 
the amount of self-financing as a signal, neutralizing the mechanism identified in Leland 
                                                
1 “The Puzzle of High Banking Sector Spread”, Economic and Business Review, Dawn, Jan.8, 2007.
2and Pyle (1977). Or, in many emerging markets, transmission through the choice of 
dividends as in John and William (1985) is not likely to work due to the corporate norm 
of not paying dividends. It is clear, even to a causal observer, that ground realities in 
emerging markets are very different from the developed markets. How do these markets 
respond? How do they continue to function? Perhaps, emerging markets respond by 
developing innovative information transmission mechanisms. That is, mechanisms 
unique to them.
In this paper, we identify a unique information transmission mechanism operating 
in South Asian equity markets.  This mechanism is associated with the equity markets of 
India and Pakistan and operates through a unique financing instrument. The instrument, 
known as badla in local parlance, allows carry forward of open positions from one 
settlement date to the next. The party carrying forward its position pays a charge called 
the badla rate. An example clarifies. Suppose an investor buys 100 shares of stock X on 
Monday at Rs 1000 per share. Assume the settlement system is T+3, which means that 
the payment and delivery takes place three days after the transaction. That means, in our 
example, the investor is required to pay Rs 100,000 on Thursday to the seller in exchange 
for the shares. If he does not have enough funds on Thursday, he could defer settlement 
till the next settlement date (Tuesday) by using the following process: The badla
financier pays the money and takes delivery from the seller2, however, at the same time, 
the financier sells the shares to the investor at a price in excess of Rs 100,000. Since the 
sale will be settled on the next settlement date, the investor benefits as his open buy 
position has been carried forward. The financier benefits since the purchase price is set 
to be in excess of Rs 100,000. The annualized percentage excess amount is termed the 
badla rate. Typically, the badla rate is determined through the forces of supply and 
demand, independently of the type of investor or stock. The financier holds the shares as 
collateral till settlement.
Essentially, badla is an instrument that facilities a carry over transactions (COT) 
through a repurchase agreement. An investor engaged in badla is simultaneously selling 
                                                
2 The per-share amount paid by the financier depends on the closing price on Thursday. In our example, we 
assume that this price is equal to the price on Monday for simplicity. However, if it is lower, the financier 
pays the lower price and the investor pays the difference. Typically, the price paid by the financier is 
further marked down by a small margin (2 to 5% in case of Pakistan) with the investor coming up with the 
difference.
3and buying (a repurchase agreement) without changing his net position. The financier is
simultaneously buying and selling (a reverse repurchase agreement). However, the 
financier is exposed to the counterparty risk. There is no way of managing this risk 
between the transaction and settlement dates since the clearing house does not guarantee 
this transaction. The presence of counterparty or default risk is the reason why badla
rates are significantly above the risk-free rate. Specifically, the badla financier faces the 
risk of not being able to recover all of his funds if the price falls significantly between 
settlement dates since in that case the investor may default. The value of shares the 
financier is holding as collateral may erode significantly.  It is precisely this risk that 
allows information transmission to take place.
In this paper, we present a signaling model of badla financing. We show that if a 
broker has superior information about the value of stocks, then he can credibly transmit 
this information to investors by choosing the level of badla financing to provide in each 
stock. Hence, badla may serve as a mechanism of information transmission separate from
the obvious function of providing liquidity. The key idea is that by providing badla, the 
broker-financier incurs counterparty risk. In equilibrium, this risk is justified if there is an 
increase in the perceived value of the stock financed since this increase translates into 
higher commission income for the broker.
Badla financiers are primarily brokers. In its original form, badla allows rollover 
of unsettled transactions from one settlement date to the next indefinitely as long as the 
investor can pay the financing costs. Badla appears strange in the context of a spot 
market since it effectively superimposes a feature of the futures market (settlement in the 
future) onto the spot market. However, the interest rate in the futures market is the risk-
free rate whereas in badla transactions, the interest rate is significantly higher due to the 
counterparty risk. The counterparty risk is significant and has resulted in various payment 
crises in both India and Pakistan. In one instance, in May 2000, several brokers in the 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) defaulted as share prices fell and badla borrowers did not 
pay up.
Badla started as an informal, though legal, credit market serving equity markets in 
South Asia. However, due to the counterparty risks involved, authorities in both countries 
tried to do away with Badla several times. In India, after each ban, badla was started 
4again in a modified form with an objective of better managing the counterparty risk. 
Eventually badla was eliminated altogether from Indian markets in 2001. In Pakistan, 
badla continues under the name of Continuous Funding System (CFS).
Despite the important role played by badla, little academic research on badla
exists. Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) report a negative abnormal return of 15% on 
badla stocks after this financing facility was banned in India for the first time in 1994. 
Husain and Rashid (2007) investigate the link between badla financing and the 
performance of KSE-100 index and report a two-way relationship. Uppal and Mangla 
(2007) undertake a comparative analysis of stock exchanges in Bombay and Karachi in 
the context of badla financing. The lack of a proper theoretical framework to guide 
empirical work may have been a reason for insufficient study of badla financing. This 
paper is an initial attempt at providing such a framework.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief description of South 
Asian equity markets is provided in the context of badla financing. Afterwards, a 
signaling model of badla financing is presented followed by a discussion of policy 
implications of the model. The following policy recommendations arise from our model. 
Badla rates must be capped and a broker-financier interested in this market must commit 
a minimum amount in every stock in which he wishes to provide financing. Badla market 
should not be segmented. Moreover, broker-financiers should not be allowed to trade on 
their own account in shares for which they provide badla in order to prevent price 
manipulation.
South Asian Equity Markets and Badla
The major stock market in Pakistan, the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), was established 
soon after independence in 1947. KSE has been declared the best performing stock 
market of the world in 2002 by “Business Week”. As of December 31, 2007, 654 
companies were listed with a market capitalization of Rs 4,204.522 billion ($68 billion)
having listed capital of Rs 671.29 billion ($10.88 billion). Average daily trade value in 
KSE is around $400 million. It is estimated that two-third of daily transactions are rolled 
over through badla. The amount of funds available in the badla market is estimated to be 
5around $1 billion.3 Apart from badla, market microstructure of KSE is the same as any 
developed market. Trading at KSE is fully automated and order-driven through limit and 
market orders. The counterparty risk inherent in badla financing has caused various 
payment crises in KSE. In one instance, in May 2000, several brokers defaulted as key 
investors refused to clear their payments due to the continuous decline in the market. 
Badla financing can potentially worsen a fall in the market since badla financiers have an 
incentive to withdraw financing in a falling market. This is reportedly what happened in 
March 2005 according to a report by the Task Force, which was set-up to investigate the 
unprecedented decline in KSE after the March 2005 crisis.  In recent history of KSE, 
badla related crises have occurred in May 2000, September 2001, May 2002, March 
2005, and June 2006. In view of these crises, various attempts have been made to 
eliminate badla financing; however, they were strongly resisted by the market, 
particularly by brokers. Badla remains in KSE in the form of CFS.
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) is the oldest stock exchange in India. It was 
established in 1875. As of November 30, 2007, equity market capitalization is $1619.18
billion with 4879 listed companies. BSE has an average daily turnover of about $2 
billion.4 BSE is an automated and order-driven market like any developed market. BSE 
was the largest badla market in South Asia for a very long time. There were many crises 
linked with badla financing. In 1993, there were defaults linked to badla financing in 
BSE forcing the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to ban this product. 
However, badla was re-started after strong resistance to the ban was shown by the broker 
community. After the March 2001 crisis, also associated with badla, SEBI banned badla
for good. For a description of tussle between SEBI and broker community over badla, see 
Echeverri-Gent (2002).
National Stock Exchange of India5 (NSE) was established in 1994. Unlike BSE, 
NSE was promoted by leading financial institutions at the behest of the government. NSE 
was the first demutualized exchange in the country where the ownership and management 
is completely divorced from the right to trade on it. This precluded conflicts of interests. 
                                                
3 For details of badla (CFS), and further information about KSE visit www.kse.org.pk
4 www.bseindia.com
5 Information about NSE is available at www.nseindia.com
6NSE initially refused to allow badla. However, in 1999, it allowed badla in a modified 
form called the Automated Borrowing and Lending Mechanism (ABLM). ABLM was 
banned after the March 2001 crisis. Hence, badla financing is now officially present only 
in Stock Exchanges of Pakistan. However, market participants argue that in India badla
continues by involving two exchanges where the first leg of the transaction is carried out 
in one exchange and the second leg in another exchange to circumvent regulations 
banning badla. 6
The Model
Consider a broker who has superior information about the value of various stocks being 
traded. It is a likely scenario since many brokerage houses have research wings engaged 
in the business of analyzing the fundamentals as well as the price trends of various 
stocks. Research resources at their disposal combined with access to real time data due to 
the market making function may lead to a better understanding of price dynamics. 
The key idea of the model is that by providing badla financing, the broker-
financier undertakes counterparty risk. In equilibrium, such risk is justified if there is 
sufficient increase in value as perceived by the market since this increase in value 
translates into higher commission income for the broker.
The following assumptions are made:
Assumption 1 The broker-financier is strictly an intermediary. 
Assumption 1 states that the broker only trades on behalf of his clients and not on his 
own account in shares in which he provides badla financing. This assumption is needed 
to ensure that the broker does not engage in price manipulation through badla financing.
Assumption 2 The return X of each firm is a random variable uniformly distributed on 
[0, K], where K characterizes the type of each firm and varies over the interval [Y, Z].  
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7Assumption 3 The broker knows each firm’s K type.
Assumptions 2 and 3 operationalize the concept of superior information possessed by the 
broker.
The model is defined within two points in time. There are a number of firms. At time 0, 
the broker’s commission in each stock, 0 , is a fraction of the total transaction value 
processed in that stock by him. With 0f as the fraction and )(VT as the total transaction 
value as a function of the value of the stock, the time-0 commission (profit) in the stock is
)(00 VTf  (1)
where 0)(  VT .
Brokerage commission, in the real world, is typically a fraction of total transaction value 
as in (1).
Apart from earning commissions at time-0, the broker also chooses the amount of 
badla financing to provide at time-0. Time-1 profits to the broker depend on his choice of 
the amount of badla financing to provide at time-0 as well as the realization of the return 
X at time-1. As explained in the introduction, badla financier is exposed to the 
counterparty risk. A relatively low value of X may lead to the borrower defaulting since, 
in that case, the shares for which badla has been given would have declined in value. 
Consequently, the financier-broker would lose a part of his investment.7 We assume that 
higher the amount of badla financing provided, higher the realized returns of the firm 
must be before the financier could earn badla profits. By providing large amounts of 
badla financing, the broker-financier takes more risk. Market perceives more risk as 
signaling greater value, so price rises by more. Unless the subsequent returns are higher 
                                                
7 The broker-financier will be able to recover a part of his investment since shares for which badla is given 
are pledged with him as collateral.
8as well to justify the price increase, the price will fall and the broker-financier will suffer 
a loss due to investor defaults. Specifically,
)(1 BXifBi 
)(1 BXifBe  (2)
where KB  )(0 . B is the amount of badla financing, i is the badla rate, )(B is an
increasing function of B , and e is a positive constant between 0 and 1. 
As B increases, )(B also increases, reducing the probability of X taking a value larger 
than )(B . Consequently, the chances of suffering a loss go up as B increases for a 
given K . By taking, BB  )(  with KB 0 , the expected value of time-1 profits can 
be expressed as:
K
B
eB
K
BK
iBE ][ 1 (3)
If type K of the firm is known then the value of its share at time-0 is:
)1(2 rN
K
V 
  (4)
where is a risk adjustment parameter and N is the number of shares outstanding.
Investors do not know the true value of K . They perceive its value to be )(Ba . That is, a 
function of the amount of badla financing provided. So, in the eyes of investors, the per-
share value of the firm is:
)1(2
)(
rN
Ba
Vp 
  (5)
9By choosing B , the amount of badla financing to provide, the broker maximizes8:



 


K
B
eB
K
BK
iB
r
VTf p
)1(
1
)(0 (6)
with 
)1(2
)(
rN
Ba
Vp 
 
The first order condition is:
K
eiB
i
N
BaTf
)(2
2
1
)((.).0
 (7)
Assuming that (.)T   is constant, replacing NT /(.) with a constant w , and recognizing 
that the broker will want the signal to be efficient, which means that the market perceives 
the correct type K through )(Ba in equilibrium, we arrive at the following differential 
form:
dB
wf
eiB
dBBa
wf
i
BdaBa
00
)(4
)(
2
)()(
 (8)
Integrating both sides:
  cwf
eiB
dBBa
wf
iBa
0
2
0
2 )(2
)(
2
2
)(
(9)
 dBBa )(  in (9) can be expressed as:
   dBBBaBBadBBa )()()(
                                                
8 Maximization is done separately for each stock.
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dB
B
Ba
B
BaBBa   2)(2)()(
22
(10)
Assuming that )(Ba  is negligibly small and ignoring   dBBBa 2)(
2
, the approximation
becomes:
2
)()()(
2B
BaBBadBBa  (11)
Using the linear approximation, B
aBaBa )0()()(  , (11) becomes:
2
)0(
2
)(
)(
BaBBa
dBBa  (12)
Suppose i is sufficiently small such that
K
B
e
K
BK
iB
2
 , that is, 0 BBK
B
e
i
(13)
If the true value of K isY then the broker has no incentive to signal and the optimal choice 
of B in that case is 0. So, (12) becomes:
22
)(
)(
YBBBa
dBBa  (14)
Substituting (14) in (9):
c
wf
eiB
wf
YiB
wf
BaiBBa 
0
2
00
2 )(2)(
2
)(
(15)
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From the boundary condition, Ya )0( , it follows that
2
2Y
c  . So, (15) becomes:
2
)(2)(
2
)( 2
0
2
00
2 Y
wf
eiB
wf
YiB
wf
BaiBBa  (16)
Hence,
wf
YiB
Y
wf
eiB
wf
iB
wf
iB
Ba
0
2
0
22
00
2)(4
)(



 (17)
The signal in (17) permits full discrimination of types and there is no incentive to signal a 
false type. Hence, a broker-financier can successfully use badla financing to signal his 
private information to investors. If the signaling mechanism disappears, as happened in 
India after the badla was banned, there will be a decline in value of stocks. Indeed, this is 
exactly what Berkman and Eleswarapu report (1998).
Implications of the Signaling Mechanism
The signaling mechanism operates through the choice of the amount of badla financing 
provided by the broker-financier. By providing badla financing, the broker-financier 
undertakes counterparty risk. In equilibrium, this risk is compensated by an increase in 
the commission income due to the increase in prices of shares in which badla is provided.
By choosing different levels of badla financing in each stock, the broker financier allows 
the market to distinguish high value stocks from low value stocks. Following policy 
recommendations arise from this model:
12
Badla rates must be capped
There is a threshold rate after which the signaling mechanism breaks down. If this 
threshold is crossed, then the broker-financier will start providing badla financing in the 
lowest K type of stock. There will not be any increase in commission income due to the 
signaling of the lowest K type. However, with badla rate above the threshold, returns 
from badla financing alone are sufficient to entice the broker-financier. The threshold 
rate can be seen in equation (13) and is given by
BZ
Be
ii
ˆ
ˆ

 (18)
where Bˆ is the lowest non-zero value of the amount of badla financing. The cap can be 
enforced by making it mandatory for any financier wishing to provide badla, to commit a 
minimum level of funds given by Bˆ and by ensuring that the badla rate does not cross i .
The cap ensures that BBandK
K
B
e
K
BK
iB ˆ
2

Badla market must not be segmented
If there are different badla rates in different stocks, that is, if badla market is segmented, 
then the signaling mechanism will not work. Market segmentation changes the incentive 
structure of the broker-financier, clouding the signaling mechanism in the process. 
Suppose there are two stocks with different badla rates, different amount of badla
financing in these stocks could be due to different K types, different badla rates, or due to 
a combination of these factors. Hence, badla market segmentation is detrimental to a 
well-functioning information transmission mechanism operating through this mode of 
financing.
13
Margining System
0,0
2)(4
2
4
)(
0
2
0
22
0
0
2







B
wf
iYB
Y
wf
eiB
wf
iB
wf
B
e
Ba
(19)
Due to a number of payment crises caused by badla financing, the demand for clearing 
house involvement through a strong margining system has grown. A strong margining 
system surely reduces the counterparty risk. However, this risk reduction comes at a cost. 
The cost can be seen in equation (19). A strong margining system reduces e . 
Since 0
)( 

e
Ba
, more badla financing is needed to signal the same K type after a 
reduction in e . Hence, efficiency of the signaling mechanism declines with a strong 
margining system. Of course, both the benefits as well the costs of a margining system 
must be considered.
Financiers trading on their own account
If broker-financiers are allowed to trade on their own account, perverse incentives are 
created. Surely, they will have an incentive to falsely signal a price increase and cashing 
in, leading to the break-down of information transmission. The regulator must ensure that 
broker-financiers act strictly as intermediaries in stocks in which they choose to provide 
badla financing.
Conclusion
Information transmission is necessary for a properly functioning equity market in a world 
of asymmetric information. However, legal and institutional preconditions necessary for a 
large number of information transmission mechanisms to work do not exist in many 
14
emerging markets. In this paper, we argue that such markets may be responding by 
developing information transmission mechanisms unique to them. Since such 
mechanisms are custom-made for the emerging markets in which they operate, the likes 
of them may not be seen in developed markets. We present an example of one such 
mechanism associated with South Asian equity markets. That mechanism operates 
through a unique financing instrument called badla. If brokers have superior information 
about the true value of various stocks then by providing badla, the broker-financiers can 
transmit this information to investors. 
The idea is that by providing badla, a broker-financier undertakes counterparty 
risk. In equilibrium, this counterparty risk is matched by an increase in commission 
incomes leading to a separating equilibrium allowing full discrimination of various types 
of stocks.
Following policy recommendations can be seem from our model. Badla rates 
must be capped. There must be a lower-bound to the amount of funds committed by a 
financier in any stock he chooses to finance. The badla market must not be segmented. 
Furthermore, broker-financiers must not be allowed to trade on their own account in 
stocks in which they choose to provide badla. 
15
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